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Many argue that autocratic regimes allocate revenues from foreign aid with the aim of 
stabilizing their rule rather than serving economic and social development. However, donors 
often condition foreign aid on reforms in recipient states. We argue that when those conditions 
for reform focus on participative processes and government accountability, they positively 
affect democratization. We evaluate our claim based on different types of World Bank and IMF 
lending programs for a panel of 100 low- and middle-income countries over the years 1980–
2011. Our results suggest that aid positively affects democratization when it strengthens 
domestic accountability mechanisms and thereby reduces its fungibility for recipients. The 
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For decades, donors have provided large volumes of foreign aid to countries like Mobutu’s 
Zaire, Marco’s Philippines, and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. In some instances, aid cemented the 
firm grip of these dictators over their countries. This is why aid – just like certain natural 
resources like oil or minerals – is often considered a curse rather than a blessing (Wright and 
Winters 2010:69-70). However, these negative examples can be contrasted with a number of 
other cases where aid recipients have experienced a successful transition to democracy.  
Under which conditions is aid a blessing rather than a curse with respect to democratization? 
 
We argue that not all resources are the same, and this also applies to foreign aid. For example, 
the effect of natural resources is known to depend on the required extraction technology (e.g., 
Girod 2012:190). Generally, resources are problematic when they create cash flows that can 
be easily appropriated by autocratic rulers. For aid, the latter depends on the degree of 
fungibility. To the extent that aid is fungible, it can be (re)allocated by autocratic regimes for 
their own purposes. Since governments can readjust the allocation of their own national 
resources in line with the external aid inflows, even if aid is earmarked for specific activities 
(Bader and Faust 2014; Boone 1996; Kosack and Tobin 2006), aid contributes to political 
leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Kono and Montinola 2009), thereby 
stabilizing the current regime (Dutta, Leeson and Williamson 2013; Morrison 2007, 2009). 
 
However, foreign aid does not always come free of conditions, and some of these conditions 
may limit fungibility, notably when they directly focus on participative processes and 
government accountability. Recent field experiments in developing countries confirm that 
enhancing the transparency of public policy, and providing opportunity for public scrutiny, 
can have substantial effects on political behavior (for an overview, see Humphreys and 




corruption (Olken 2005), and that citizen oversight has a powerful effect on the quality of 
local health care delivery (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009). When accountability is increased, 
for instance in response to the conditions of a specific aid program, public agents that may 
have otherwise diverted resources for their own  private goals, feel compelled to use these 
resources for the benefit of the general public. This is exactly the process we have in mind 
when we refer to limitations of fungibility as an implication of appropriate conditionality. 
 
Girod (2012) also refers to the potential of aid conditional on reform, but shows that donor-
imposed reform requirements may not be taken seriously by recipient governments if they 
have other resources to replace the aid flows. While she focuses on the fungibility of natural 
resources, our focus is on the fungibility of aid resources themselves. Moreover, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the argument by differentiating between different 
types of aid. The discussion thereby contributes to the strand of ‘resource curse’ (and ‘aid 
curse’) literature that looks at the specific conditions under which these resources can be 
beneficial (Colgan 2010, 2011; Girod 2012). In a similar way, it contributes to the 
development of a more nuanced literature on the effect of conditionality. This literature goes 
beyond a general cross-the-board assessment of whether it is successful or not, but typically 
differentiates with respect to institutional and political conditions in recipient countries rather 
than with respect to different types of conditionalities attached to aid (e.g., Beazer and Woo 
2015). 
 
Our paper combines insights from the conditionality and resource fungibility discussion and 
introduces them into the aid and democratization literature. The role of conditionality for the 
effect of aid on democratization is best examined by studying the different lending 
instruments of the two major international financial institutions (IFIs): the World Bank (WB) 




followed by bilateral donor agencies, which further scales up the effect to be observed. Their 
assistance often comes along with specific conditions on economic and institutional reform 
that – despite statutory prohibitions against political interference – must be expected to have 
political consequences for recipient nations (see Killick 1995). 
 
Given the variety of conditionalities attached to the IFIs’ different lending instruments, we 
expect some variation in whether they pave or undermine the way to democratization. Those 
aid types that come with requirements that indirectly limit fungibility, e.g., through increased 
accountability of political leaders, should have a positive effect on democratization. In 
contrast, those aid types that do not come with such conditions should have a negative effect 
on democratization. To examine these differences, we sort the different aid activities into four 
major categories of lending instruments: (i) World Bank Investment Projects (INV), (ii) IMF 
Stabilization Programs (STB), (iii) the institutions’ Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), 
and (iv) their more recent lending based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach. 
 
Using panel data for a sample of 100 developing countries over a period of 30 years, and 
controlling for a number of alternative explanations, we offer suggestive, but robust evidence 
for the different effects of aid depending on its conditionality. In the example of IFI lending, 
where the different types of conditionality can be distinguished most clearly, we show that 
those aid types that come with conditions that (indirectly) limit fungibility have a positive 
effect on democratic regime transition (PRS, and possibly SAP), while the other aid types 
show no, or even a negative effect.  
 
These results are relevant beyond the context of development cooperation as they point to 
general institutional mechanisms promoting democratization. If such mechanisms can be 




curse literature might also be mitigated. Moreover, given that the IFIs make an active choice 
within their menu of lending types, our results can also be used to assess the performance of 
these international organizations (IOs) along the lines suggested, e.g., in Gutner and 
Thompson 2010.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We first review important contributions 
of the aid and democratization literature. This is followed by a presentation of our theoretical 
framework and its implications for the relationships between the four different lending types 
and democratization. In the remaining sections we discuss the data and operationalization of 
our hypotheses, introduce our econometric estimation strategy, and present the results. The 
last section concludes. 
 
Earlier research on aid and democratization 
Existing research on aid and democratization can be divided into three, at times overlapping, 
strands: pessimistic, optimistic, and conditional. Aid pessimists argue that foreign aid has a 
negative effect on democracy, because it makes governments less accountable to their 
citizens. According to them, foreign aid is a highly fungible resource and similar to other 
forms of non-tax revenues, particularly oil and other rents from mineral extraction. Foreign 
aid reduces a government’s need for taxation, which normally exhibits greater levels of public 
scrutiny and cannot easily be appropriated by the ruling elite (see, e.g., Djankov, Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol 2008; Knack 2004; Wright and Winters 2010).  
 
Conversely, aid optimists argue that aid is different from oil and other non-tax revenues. 
While these scholars generally acknowledge the negative baseline effect of non-tax revenues 
(including aid) on democratization, they argue that aid agencies have added value to the 




the modalities that make aid money less fungible than the rents generated from natural 
resources (Goldsmith 2001; Dunning 2004; Collier 2006; Bermeo 2011). In particular, aid 
specifically intended to improve government accountability and democratic institution 
appears to have a positive effect (Aronow, Carnegie and Marinov 2012; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán 
and Seligson 2007; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010; Nielsen and Nielson 2010; Scott and Steele 
2011;). 
 
Many of these more optimistic studies belong to a conditional strand within the aid 
effectiveness literature, which suggests that the impact of aid on democratization depends on 
conditions attached, the nature of the recipient’s regime, donor intent, and the time period 
allowed for aid to become effective (see Bermeo 2011; Dutta et al. 2013; Kersting and Kilby 
2014; Kono and Montinola 2009; Montinola 2010; Morrison 2007, 2009; Wright 2009; Licht 
2010). Conditions attached to aid may force the government to move towards better 
governance, but may also release the government of its responsibility towards its citizens, and 
substitute accountability to the public with accountability to donor agencies. When aid is 
conditional on good governance, recipient governments seem to respond to these incentives 
(Dreher, Öhler and Nunnenkamp 2012; Kersting and Kilby 2014). 
 
The analysis of different types of conditionality should be particularly relevant for IFI 
lending, where it is amply applied and used in a variety of forms ranging from simple project 
specific conditions to large-scale economic and institutional reforms (policy and process 
conditionality). Yet, even generally, the effect of IFI lending on democratization has only 
been examined in a few academic studies thus far, perhaps because of the politically neutral 
appearance cherished and cultivated by the IFIs. Barro and Lee examine the effect of the 
IMF’s stabilization programs on a number of different economic and political outcome 




a small negative effect (Barro and Lee 2005:1266). By contrast, econometric results by 
Nelson and Wallace (2005:22-23) suggest that countries undergoing IMF programs show 
significantly stronger democratization and an increasingly positive trend over time. Abouharb 
and Cingranelli’s (2007a,b) path-breaking analysis on the IFI’s human rights impact finds that 
longer exposure to structural conditionality is positively correlated with procedural 
democracy. However, it is negatively correlated with a wide range of civil, worker and human 
rights that may be associated with substantive democracy. Some additional studies on the 
IFIs’ impact on democratization exist, but they are constrained by more limited data coverage 
regarding time and geographical focus (Brown 2009; Moore and Scarrit 1990).  
 
In the following section, we will argue that some of the seemingly contradictory effects 
observed in the existing studies could be related to different types of IFI conditionality 
associated with alternative lending instruments, and to the related effect on the fungibility of 
aid resources. 
 
Aid, fungibility, and the impact on democratization 
Economic development can foster democratization though different mechanisms, as discussed 
in the literature building on the modernization thesis (Lipset 1959; Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub and Limongi 2000). Several scholars have argued that democratization is a strategic 
choice by the elite to maximize its welfare. Democratization is most likely if elites feel less 
threatened because of low inequality or high capital mobility (Boix 2003), elites are willing to 
make concessions to citizens in order to stay in power, and citizens are able to institutionalize 
their power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), or if the elite can get the opposition inside the 
regime (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Put differently, democratization generates winners and 
losers, and in order to consolidate, “democratic institutions must at the same time protect all 





Foreign aid constitutes an important source of income for many developing countries. Thus, 
the question emerges how aid interferes with the mechanisms described above. Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2009) show that the effect of aid programs depends on their impact on 
leadership and policy. The authors illustrate that leaders of countries that receive aid choose 
policies and resource allocations that protect their hold on power. To the extent that such 
policies and allocations are compatible with good economic or social performance, they will 
make decisions that are social-welfare enhancing. However, if faced with a contradiction 
between actions that enhance their own political welfare – e.g., transfers to their clientele 
(say, the ‘elite’) – and actions that advance societal well-being, recipient leaders will select 
the former. Transfers to the elite will help the existing regime to survive so that it can 
continue to pursue the same policy choice in the future. Consequently, citizens in these 
recipient countries have to face “bad policies” and “bad leaders” (Mesquita and Smith 
2009:336). A growing literature now confirms that aid improves political leader survival 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Kono and Montinola, 2009), thereby stabilizing the 
current regime (Dutta et al. 2013; Morrison 2007, 2009). 
 
While this holds irrespective of whether the country is governed democratically, our focus is 
on the difficulties that aid may present by stabilizing autocracies. The basic problem in this 
context is that aid is fungible, so that autocratic regimes can (re)allocate aid for their own 
purposes. Since governments can readjust the allocation of their own national resources in 
line with the external aid inflows, they can reallocate the funds even if aid is earmarked for 




fungibility may contribute to autocratic survival as it offers an avenue for patronage, 
repression, and demobilization of threatening interest groups.1  
 
We contribute to this debate by showing that not all types of aid are equally fungible. 
Fungibility may be constrained by policy and, even more so, process conditionality in ways 
that have not yet been fully explored in the literature. While the general problems related to 
conditionality are well-known (see, e.g., Wright and Winters 2010), conditionality can still 
limit the incumbent’s freedom of choice between his own political welfare and actions that 
advance societal well-being. Policy conditionality directly relates to the economic policies 
adopted by the recipient government, and process conditionality relates to reforms in the 
political decision making process itself, notably to the role of the elite versus the general 
population within this process, and to the interaction of different parts of the executive 
branch. In such a context, diverting resources becomes politically costly, and therefore, 
indirectly, these resources become less fungible. Put differently, a state is not a unitary actor, 
and where conditionality strengthens civil society and increases the involvement of other state 
actors in the resource allocation process (through vertical and horizontal accountability of the 
government), it can increase the number of actors able to constrain fungibility.  
 
Different aid types come along with specific policy and process requirements. As a 
consequence, the above discussion leads to different predictions regarding the effect of each 
of these aid types on democratization: Elites (in autocracies) will only accept aid if they 
believe it will help or at least not hamper their survival. The extent to which those elites are 
able to leverage these external resources for their own purposes, however, depends on the 
types of aid. Those aid types that come with policy requirements that indirectly limit 
                                                 
1 The problem of aid fungibility is closely related to the issues described as the “resource curse”. For a discussion 




fungibility will have a positive effect on democratization. In contrast, we expect those aid 
types that do not come with such conditions to have a negative effect on democratization.  
 
Before we discuss the different aid types and their expected effect, let us illustrate the above 
discussed mechanism with an example. Michaelowa (2011:464-465) describes the case of 
Malawi, where the IMF had set a ceiling for public expenditure, which was then translated 
into corresponding sector budgets. In order to strengthen local ownership, to improve 
transparency and to enable the ministry to carry out reliable mid-term financial planning, 
other donors considered replacing traditional project aid with joint education sector budget 
support. This could have enhanced democratic accountability. However, IMF conditionality 
purely focusing on (fiscal) accountability towards the multilateral lending agency prevented 
this effect. The donors’ intention to support education through the budget itself had become 
impossible, because – as a consequence of the indirect limitation of the sector budget by the 
IMF – the government’s own spending on education would have been cut accordingly 
(“fungibility by construction”). In sum, the IMF intervention invited fungibility and prevented 
potential democratic development in this case. Only an increased emphasis on cooperation 
between ministries, notably the finance ministry and the education ministry, eventually led to 
the discovery of this problem and provided the necessary incentives to search for solutions. 
What the example also shows is the crucial role of coordination between the different aid 
agencies. If they do not cooperate, conditionality (like the limitations of the budget by the 






Different World Bank and IMF program types and their expected effect on 
democratization 
Based on common characteristics regarding their aid modalities, we now identify the four 
types of lending programs according to which we will categorize the multiple financial 
instruments used by the IFIs. Two questions guide this classification: First, does the financial 
instrument belong to the World Bank’s or the IMF’s traditional core business with the 
individual organization’s own particular aid modalities, or does it reflect the move of the IFIs 
towards collaboration through similar objectives (notably long-term economic development 
and poverty reduction) and/or coordinated conditionality of their programs? Second, for the 
more collaborative programs: are they conditioned exclusively on the implementation of 
particular policies, or do they also include process conditions with regard to the formulation 
of these policies (ownership, civil society participation)? These guiding questions lead us to 
the distinction of the following general program types: (1) World Bank Investment Projects 
(WB-INV), (2) IMF Stabilization Programs (IMF-STB), (3) IFI Structural Adjustment 
Programs (IFI-SAP), and (4) IFI Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (IFI-PRS). Table 1  
provides an overview of their different characteristics and the individual lending instruments 
subsumed. For further details on our classification procedure, and on the various financial 
instruments taken into account, see “Supplementary File” Annex 1.  
 
In the following the four different program types with their specific conditionalites will be 







Table 1: Types of IFI program lending 












5-10 years WB: Specific Investment Loan, Sector 
Investment and Maintenance Loan, 













1-3 years IMF: Stand-by Arrangement, Extended 
Fund Facility, Flexible Credit Line 













3-4 years WB: Sector Adjustment Loan, Structural 
Adjustment Loan, Programmatic Structural 
Adjustment Loan, Special Structural 
Adjustment Loan; IMF: Structural 
Adjustment Facility, Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility 













3-4 years WB: Poverty Reduction Support Credit; 
IMF: Poverty Reduction and Growth 




World Bank Investment Projects (WB-INV) 
The World Bank’s investment project financing (WB-INV) represents a majority of the 
Bank’s lending portfolio and has constituted its core business since 1946. Investment projects 
aiming at building the physical and social infrastructure of a country have a medium to long-
term focus (5-10 years) and, in general, only project-specific requirements attached.2 Similar 
to most bilateral aid funds, investment projects provide funding to the government to cover 
specific expenditures related to the implementation of the project or the quality of assets being 
financed. The accompanying legal agreement sets forth the contractual obligations for both 
parties, including prerequisites for disbursement as well as project-specific standard and non-
standard covenants, such as Bank-mandated fiduciary, and environmental and social 
safeguard policies. Investment project financing is most widely used in the infrastructure, 
human development, agriculture, and public administration sectors.  
                                                 
2 An internal Bank report (2006:10) shows that in the mid-1990s, the complexity of investment projects grew, and 
they increasingly covered a wider range of activities within a sector, and had corresponding sector policy 
conditions attached. This resulted in a convergence of structural adjustment programs and investment projects. 
Due to streamlining efforts, however, the number of investment operations with sector policy conditions was 





Since generally, no political or process conditions are attached to these financial flows, the 
borrower government may reduce own spending in this area, and use these funds for setting 
its own priorities without externally induced limitations. As a consequence, the incumbent is 
not constrained in distributing rents to his own clientele at the cost of the general population.  
Furthermore, investment finance is generally disbursed without any consideration of power 
relations within the state. Investment projects are negotiated between the executive and the 
representatives of the World Bank, while the legislative does not take part in the negotiations 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007b:204). As a result, these projects are often funded outside the 
budget without being subject to parliamentary review. This reinforces already existing 
deficiencies in democratic oversight, and leads to the fungibility of aid inflows due to lack of 
transparency. 
 
We conclude that aid in the form of investment projects financing is highly fungible and may 
hence hamper, rather than encourage, democratization.  
 
IMF Stabilization Programs (IMF-STB) 
The IMF’s core business (IMF-STB) traditionally centers on financial assistance to member 
countries during a crisis, when they face temporary balance of payments difficulties. Program 
duration of these financial instruments is thus usually restricted to 1-3 years. In return for 
balance of payments support, the IMF typically requires that the borrower government 
initiates fiscal, monetary and social reforms aimed at restoring balance of payments viability 
and maintaining macroeconomic stability.3  
 
                                                 




The conditions associated with those stabilization programs, like raising taxes and cutting 
expenditures, currency devaluations, and pension reforms, affect large parts of the population 
and are likely to cause social protest (Brown 2009:436). However, what seems to matter most 
is that the Fund’s capital infusions bail out political leaders under stress. Autocrats may thus 
use the money to cement their place in power and blame the IMF for unpopular policies 
(Vreeland 2003:13). Furthermore, it is often argued that countries facing a financial crisis 
need to reform their economy first, before they address their political problems (Bueno de 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003:477). The IMF may thus prefer to establish 
working relations with governments that are powerful enough to push through “unpopular but 
necessary” reforms (Kalinowski 2007:346). In crisis situations, governments often rule per 
emergency law. Political decisions are taken by decree or pushed through the legislature 
(Przeworski 1991:184). 
 
The financial assistance from the Fund’s stabilization program is fungible because the 
conditions attached do not increase state actors’ awareness of, and involvement in, the 
resource allocation process. On the contrary, financial crisis in combination with deficit 
lending reduces the power of civil society vis-á-vis the state. In addition, since working 
relations are primarily established with the finance ministry, other parts of the executive or the 
parliament are involved only to a limited extent. Just as in the case of the World Bank’s 
investment projects, we therefore expect that the resource inflow associated with stabilization 
programs does not create conditions conducive to democratization. Overall, we instead expect 
a negative effect.  
 
IFI Structural Adjustment Programs (IFI-SAP) 
Collaboration between World Bank and IMF to support their country members’ structural 




guidelines, which help to ensure that their respective support is consistent by combining the 
specific expertise and financial resources of each institution.4 Structural adjustment programs 
can be stand-alone, but are more often part of a programmatic series of operations providing 
budget support to borrower governments, in which a medium-term program (3-4 years) of 
policy or institutional reform is supported. Funds are disbursed against the completion of 
structural and institutional reforms that traditionally cover the sectors trade and economic 
management, agriculture and infrastructure, and financial and private sector development 
(Koeberle et al. 2005:63; IEO 2007:5; World Bank 2007:6).  
 
Even though these reforms tend to weaken the role of the state in all economic activities (e.g., 
through privatization of state-owned enterprises and civil service reform) the power of the 
state elites vis-á-vis civil society might not be constrained, as adjustment loans significantly 
increase the size of non-tax revenues. This enables political leaders to comply with structural 
reforms and, at the same time, to use at least some of the assistance to secure their grip on 
power (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007:254). However, the IFIs possess significant 
leverage since they can credibly commit to withhold their funds in case of non-performance. 
This is even more so when they coordinate their intervention. As institutional reforms – e.g., 
introducing transparency and increasing efficiency in the public and private sectors – have 
often been part of the deal, oversight and regulation agencies may gain some power within the 
state apparatus (Brown 2009:477; Cull and Effron 2008:316). Moreover, recipients of 
adjustment lending are typically not facing solely temporary balance of payment needs, 
rather, they are in prolonged financial distress, a situation that cannot be managed by 
emergency law, but requires adequate domestic political debate.  
 
                                                 
4 See Koeberle, Bedoya, Silarszky and Verheyen (2005:76) and the report of the external review committee on 




Taken together, we expect that the policy conditions that are attached to the adjustment 
lending works towards a small positive effect on the power balance within the state. The 
negative effect due to the “foreign-aid-for-policy deals” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2007:251) should be compensated by the direct effect of institutional conditions. It follows 
that these programs’ policy conditions reduce the fungibility of structural adjustment lending 
and thus overall effect on democratization should be (weakly) positive. 
 
IFI Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (IFI-PRS) 
Over time, collaboration between World Bank and IMF has become more systematic in 
regard to their poverty-focused lending instruments. Poverty reduction lending is similar to 
structural adjustment lending in that these lending instruments also come in the form of 
programmatic support for medium-term policy and institutional reforms. However, poverty 
reduction programs differ significantly from adjustment operations in that they support 
country-owned strategies aimed at achieving sustainable growth and, in particular, poverty 
reduction. Moreover, the nature of conditionality has changed considerably. Both IFIs have 
moved away from conditionality in regards to privatization, civil service and trade reforms, 
and the main focus here lies on public sector governance reforms (see Koeberle et al. 
2005:62-63; IEO 2007: 5,16-17).  
 
At least in principle, lending is made conditional on the foregone participation of civil society 
in the PRS process (process conditionality). It is expected that societal actors use this political 
space to engage in policy dialogue and to oppose the arbitrary use of state power. 
Furthermore, the IFI have moved beyond the removal of economic distortions towards 
building complex institutional infrastructure in recipient countries. For example, they focus on 




parliamentary oversight. All these measures aim at making public financial flows more 
transparent and installing appropriate checks and balances on central government behavior.  
 
Among all program types, poverty reduction lending should be the least fungible. The process 
conditionality attached to this form of aid increases the accountability of the government with 
respect to other state actors. Overall, we thus expect poverty reduction lending to have a 
positive effect on democratization. 
 
We can sum up the theoretical discussion with the following observations (see Figure 1): 
• The “traditional” lending approaches (WB-INV and IMF-STB) should have a negative 
effect on democratization as is aid is highly fungible.  
• Poverty reduction programs (IFI-PRS) are expected to have a positive effect on 
democratization as fungibility is substantially reduced. 
• The effect of structural adjustment programs (IFI-SAP) on democratization is positive but 
small, as fungibility is only partially limited. 
 
Data and operationalization 
To explore the impact of different types of World Bank and IMF programs, we undertake a 
panel data analysis based on annual data from 1980 to 2011 for approximately 100 low- and 
middle income countries. Some data are not available for all countries or years, so that the 
panel is unbalanced and the exact number of observations depends on the choice of variables. 
In the following, we will only briefly discuss the different variables used. More details can be 





































































Democratization in our paper is best understood as an incremental process, whereby a 
political regime changes from autocracy towards democracy. From a theoretical perspective, 
it is difficult to define threshold values for democracy, autocracy, or hybrid regimes. Another 
difficulty is that the change in the quality of democracy is two-way and the movement may 
also occur towards more autocracy. We therefore rely on the polity2 regime indicator, which 
measures the quality of a political regime on a continuous scale from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). It includes both, the vertical and the horizontal 
dimension that have been considered in our theoretical analysis (for more details, see 
Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). We rescale the variable to range from 0 to 20. As we are 
interested in explaining a move towards democracy, rather than a given level of democracy, 
we need to specify a dynamic model, and we do so by introducing the lagged dependent 
variable as a control for the level of democracy at the beginning of each period.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Participation in IMF-STB, IFI-SAP, or IFI-PRS is measured by a dichotomous variable for 
each program type in any specific year.  The variable equals 1 if a country is financially 
supported by at least one of the lending instruments included in this program type (at any time 
of the year), and 0 otherwise. With this dichotomous coding scheme, we follow Vreeland 
(2003:18) as many others (e.g., Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Sturm, Berger, and de Haan 
2005). As opposed to the other three program types there is only little variation in the dummy 
variable for WB-INV, with an average of 83 countries participating per year. This 
particularity can be attributed to the combination of long investment duration with high 
frequency of project occurrence. We deal with this problem by recoding WB-INV as a 
categorical variable, regrouping investment projects into four types of financial instruments 




and Maintenance Loan, Financial Intermediary Loan, and Technical Assistance Loan) and 
reporting the sum of the types used for a country in any specific year. 
 
Control variables 
In selecting our control variables, we rely on prior theory and research on structural 
conditions for democratic transitions (Doorenspleet 2004; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, 
Kristensen and O’Halloran 2006; Gasiorowski 1995), on democratic diffusion (Brinks and 
Coppedge 2006; Rudra 2005; Wejnert 2005; Starr 1991; Starr and Lindborg 2003), and on 
democracy promotion by foreign actors (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Finkel et al. 2007; 
Knack 2004; Pevehouse 2002; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). For details on the 
selection of each of these explanatory variables see “Supplementary File” Annex 1.5 
 
To take modernization effects into account we use GDP per capita, GDP per capita change, 
and the urbanization rate. Democratic diffusion processes can be thought of as global and/or 
regional phenomena. We measure global diffusion by the sum of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP, and regional diffusion by calculating the change in the regional average 
value of the polity2 regime indicator over a given period of years for each of the five regions 
in our sample. To proxy instability, we include the price level of consumption and an index 
measuring a change in the level of armed conflict intensity. 
 
There are a number of other controls in cross-country analysis of democratization, such as 
dummies for particular historical and cultural heritages of developing countries (see Clague, 
Gleason, and Knack 2001; Linder and Bächtiger 2005). As long as these variables are time-
invariant, their influence will be captured by individual country fixed effects (see below).  
                                                 






In order to take into account the nested structure of our data, we use panel estimation with 
fixed effects. This has the virtue of addressing the problem of omitted variable bias of cross-
section data by controlling for unobservable country-specific variables that are correlated with 
one or more of the explanatory variables. A Hausman test strongly rejects random effects for 
all program types, thus confirming the need for fixed effects. Our main specifications include 
fixed effects both for countries and for years (two-way fixed effects). Alternative estimation 
strategies based on panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) are discarded, as the cross-country 
dimension of our sample clearly dominates. Remaining within-cluster correlation is taken into 
account through robust estimation clustering at the country level. 
 
As our dynamic specification requires the inclusion of the initial level of democracy, simple 
fixed effects regression faces the problem of Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). While Monte Carlo 
analysis by Judson and Owen (1999:12) showed that this bias is largely concentrated on the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, doubts about the value of this coefficient affect 
the interpretation of the other coefficients even if they are consistently estimated (Birchler and 
Michaelowa 2013:7). This implies that the interpretation of these fixed effects models should 
focus on the direction and the significance of the observed effects, rather than on their exact 
value.  
 
Like the aid effectiveness literature in general, we also face a large number of other 
endogeneity problems. If the IFIs prefer lending to democracies (which would violate their 
formal rules, but may still be plausible) then our model suffers from reverse causality with 
respect to all aid related variables. The same problem arises if demand for IFI lending is 




were more common in less democratic countries because such countries have fewer veto 
players who can oppose these programs.  
 
Moreover, some of the control variables such as GDP are also likely to be affected by 
democracy. Unfortunately, convincing instrumental variables are very hard to find. As argued 
by Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi (2012), the instruments used in the literature are 
generally so bad that it is more convincing to stay with OLS, while using first differences (or 
fixed effects), and an appropriate distinction between different types of aid. They further 
suggest that using two-way fixed effects can take care of most of the endogeneity concern 
plaguing the aid effectiveness literature, which suggests that additional instrumentation may 
be not only misleading, but also unnecessary. 
 
In our case, instrumentation is even more unreliable than in the cases they consider, because 
we simultaneously need to instrument for four different aid variables. Hence, all attempts to 
obtain reasonable model specifications in this setting, either using 2SLS or GMM, were 
bound to fail. As in most cases of this nature, there remains considerable concern about the 
strength and the exogeneity of the instruments. In terms of the sign and significance of 
coefficient estimates, we can easily produce results in line with our hypotheses, but the 
validity of the overall results remains questionable when using instrumentation. Our main 
analysis therefore follows Clemens et al. (2012) who rely on simple two-way fixed effects 
without instrumentation.  
 
Another important issue is to distinguish whether any effect we observe for the different 
lending programs is truly due to the nature of aid programs, or to the political climate during 
the period in which this instrument was primarily employed. Bearce and Tirone (2010) for 




enforced more easily after the end of the Cold War, so that all types of aid may have become 
more effective. In this case a program like the PRS may wrongly appear more effective than 
others, simply because it was introduced only in the late 1990s while other lending 
instruments were available throughout the whole period of analysis, including the difficult 
Cold War period. To avoid this problem, the main regression was rerun only for the period 
during which we actually observe PRS in the data (i.e., from 1999 onwards).  
 
Finally, as emphasized by Clemens et al. (2012), it is important to carefully consider the time 
frame within which any impact of aid should be expected. The effect of IFI lending, and the 
conditions attached to it, on democracy can certainly not be expected to be immediate. It 
should take time until political decision making procedures and economic policies are 
adjusted, and this adjustment is what we hypothesize to bring about potential democratization 
(see also Kersting and Kilby 2014). We thus consider that a time horizon of five years might 
be a reasonable approximation. However, as there is little theoretical guidance on how long 
the period should be, we first compute some preliminary regressions, estimating our main 
specification over various time horizons (t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, t+5). The results confirm that a 
five-year lag is appropriate. For all lending types except for WB-INV, the absolute size of the 
coefficient and the level of precision (whether significant or not) increases with the number of 
years these programs are in place. When change is measured within only one or two years, the 
overall regression is completely dominated by the effect of the lagged dependent variable (see 
“Supplementary File” Annex 2, Table A2.1).  
 
Empirical results 
Impact of program lending on democratization 
Our results based on a five-year lag between all explanatory variables (and controls) and the 




that is in line with our expectation about the positive link between IFI-SAP and IFI-PRS and 
the level of democracy. WB-INV and IMF-STB have negative coefficients, but are 
insignificant. When we add our control variables, these results remain unchanged, but we 
observe some drop in the coefficients of IFI-PRS and IFI-SAP. When we add the lagged 
dependent variable in regression 3, in order to generate a dynamic model that controls for the 
initial level of democracy, these coefficients further drop and IFI-SAP falls slightly below 
conventional significance levels (p-value=12%). PRS programs are still significant, and also 
remain so when we restrict the time period to the years during which all the different lending 
programs have simultaneously been in place (regression 4) unless we additionally enter year 
fixed effects as in regressions 1-3 (regression 5). In regression 6 where we use the full set of 
observations since 1980, omit the year fixed effects, but include period dummies for the 
decade after the end of the Cold War (1990-1999) and the period with IFI-PRS fully 
established as a new lending instrument (2000-2011), we recover the positive and significant 
effect of both IFI-PRS and IFI-SAP. The period dummies are significantly positive, which is 
in line with the generally higher level of democracy in these years relative to the Cold War 
period. Throughout all regression specifications in Table 2, the coefficients of WB-INV and 
IMF-STB remain negative, but insignificant. 
 
To some extent, these insignificant results may be driven by opposing effects of increased 
fungibility on which we focus here, and the democracy-enhancing effects of improved 
economic development (notably for WB-INV). However, it should be noted that generally, 
the inclusion of two-way fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable does not leave much 
variation in the model to be explained. This is also obvious from the lack of significant 
coefficients for the control variables. It is even more remarkable that IFI-PRS remains 
positively significant throughout, except if the period of observation is additionally shortened 




provide us with some confidence that the process conditionality emphasizing country 
ownership and civil society participation through PRS lending indeed shows some positive 
effect on the level of democracy, and that the positive coefficient for IFI-PRS hence captures 
more than just a favorable change of the general environment.  
 














              
WB-INV (t-5) -0.01 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 
 (0.94) (0.59) (0.47) (0.38) (0.46) (0.47) 
IMF-STB (t-5) -0.68 -0.51 -0.46 -0.31 -0.30 -0.59 
 (0.12) (0.25) (0.29) (0.44) (0.47) (0.17) 
IFI-SAP (t-5) 1.26*** 0.72* 0.58 0.21 0.22 0.73* 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.12) (0.48) (0.47) (0.05) 
IFI-PRS (t-5) 1.92*** 1.31** 0.99** 0.68* 0.59 0.97** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.16) (0.02) 
Polity (t-5)   0.26*** -0.03 -0.03 0.26*** 
   (0.00) (0.65) (0.64) (0.00) 
GDP per capita, log 
(t-5)  -1.76** 
 
-1.19** -0.10 -0.33 -1.06* 
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.90) (0.71) (0.06) 
 
GDP per capita 
change (t-5)  -0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
  (0.49) (0.35) (0.61) (0.51) (0.42) 
Urbanization rate  
(t-5)  -0.02 
 
-0.02 0.09 0.04 0.00 
  (0.76) (0.71) (0.38) (0.71) (0.95) 
Price level, log (t-5)  -1.16* -1.04** -0.15 -0.12 -0.96** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.76) (0.83) (0.04) 
Trade openess, log 
(t-5)  0.24 0.11 -0.71 -0.83 0.25 
  (0.77) (0.88) (0.34) (0.33) (0.72) 
Conflict  intensity  
(t-5)  -0.39 -0.33 -0.22 -0.22 -0.27 
  (0.19) (0.25) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) 
Regional diffusion 
(t-5)  0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.09 0.01 
  (0.76) (0.83) (0.66) (0.80) (0.89) 
1990-1999      2.50*** 
      (0.00) 
2000-2011      2.85*** 
      (0.00) 
       
Observations 3,234 2,381 2,374 1,140 1,140 2,374 
R-squared 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.05 0.05 0.35 
Number of countries 107 100 100 98 98 100 
Robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. 






In order to increase the confidence in our results we carry out a number of additional 
regressions that are presented in Table 3. Our main interest thereby is to verify the results 
regarding IFI-PRS. As a first step, we rerun regression 3 of the previous table, but we omit the 
years during which countries have received only PRS-based lending, and have not benefitted 
from any other of the four lending program types. This does not change the results.  
 
In the second regression, we examine whether it is the amount of lending or the type of 
lending that influences democratization. We therefore add an additional control for the 
volume of all lending received through the four program types. This additional variable is 
insignificant while IFI-PRS remains significant (with an almost unchanged coefficient). As 
the World Bank is often considered as some kind of a lead donor, the PRS dummy could also 
capture bilateral aid. In the fourth regression, we therefore include a control for the volume of 
bilateral aid. This alternative aid variable is also insignificant, and although the size of the IFI-
PRS coefficient is reduced to 0.85, it is still relatively close to the initial value and continues 
to be significant.  
 
The fourth regression controls for geopolitical considerations influencing IFI lending (see, 
e.g., Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009a, 2009b; Kilby 2006, 2011, 2013; Stone 2002, 2004) 
and possibly democratization simultaneously. We do not observe any relevant changes in the 
results. 
 
The final two regressions take up remaining concerns with endogeneity. Regression 5 uses a 
placebo test to examine potential issues of reverse causality or co-determination regarding the 
lending programs. While we keep the control variables for the period before we measure 




Table 3: Robustness tests 


















             
WB-INV -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.13 0.03 1.42** 
 (0.43) (0.44) (0.28) (0.51) (0.58) (0.01) 
IMF-STB -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.44 0.07 -2.43 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.31) (0.62) (0.21) 
IFI-SAP 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.04 -2.11 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19) (0.77) (0.38) 
IFI-PRS 0.94* 0.97* 0.85* 1.00* 0.19 4.94* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.37) (0.06) 
Polity (lag) 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24***  -0.42*** 0.72*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) 
GDP per capita, log -1.22** -1.34* -1.12* -1.32 -0.00 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (1.00) (0.92) 
GDP per capita change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.35** -0.05 
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.48) (0.36) (0.05) (0.49) 
Urbanization rate -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.01 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.46) (0.62) (0.71) (0.79) 
Price level, log -1.08** -1.00* -1.03* -0.98* -0.05 -1.27 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.68) (0.38) 
Trade openness, log 0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.04 -1.55 
 (0.95) (0.96) (0.89) (0.89) (0.44) (0.38) 
Conflict  intensity -0.32 -0.30 -0.35 -0.39 0.83*** -0.29 
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.24) (0.17) (0.00) (0.76) 
Regional diffusion -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01  0.11 
 (0.88) (0.82) (0.92) (0.97)  (0.54) 
Lending volume 
(INV+STB+SAP+PRS)  4.32     
  (0.15)     
Bilateral aid   2.53    
   (0.32) 
 
  
US military aid    0.003   
    (0.45)   
UNGA voting with US    1.68   
    (0.37)   
UNSC rotating member    -0.17   
    (0.64)   
       
Observations 2,367 2,111 2,345 2,096 2,670 2,374 
R-squared 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.81  
Number of countries 100 87 100 87 100 100 
Robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions 1-4 & 6: Independent variables lagged by five years. 
In regression 1, for all countries, those years in which they received only PRS lending are excluded (7 observations lost as compared to 
Table 2, regression 3). 
Regression 5: Dependent variable (Polity) = (t-1), aid programs (INV, STB, SAP, and PRS) = (t), control variables = (t-2). 
Regression 6: Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions: p = 0.70, Arellano-Bond AR(2) test for the differenced residuals: p =  0.95, 
number of instruments = 77. To avoid an excessive number of instruments, we collapsed them and limited the number of lags to 2 (using the 
Stata commands provided by Roodman 2006). Note, however, that results are extremely sensitive to changes in the specification, notably in 





measurement. As a result, the dependent variable is measured before the IFI interventions. If 
our previous result was the outcome of the IFIs selectivity, providing aid to democratic 
countries, rather than promoting democratization through their interventions, the coefficient 
should still be significant. This is not the case. The results suggest that – in line with their 
formal rules – IFIs do not distinguish between political regimes when they make their lending 
decisions. This is also consistent with Reinsberg’s (2015) finding that bilateral donors react to 
regime change by adjusting aid allocation, while the World Bank does not.  
 
To be sure, regression 6 presents an attempt to instrument all potentially endogenous 
variables. As we could not find convincing external instruments for a 2SLS model, we use 
system GMM, a method that has the additional advantage of being designed specifically for 
dynamic panel models (Blundell and Bond 1998). System GMM instruments the different 
variables considered as endogeneous (including the lagged dependent variable) by their 
lagged levels and differences. The results on IFI-PRS are in line with our previous 
estimations, in fact, the coefficient is now much larger than before. IFI-SAP and IMF 
stabilization programs remain insignificant. World Bank investment projects now show a 
positively significant coefficient. However, it should be noted that slight variations in the 
number of lags included for the instruments or other minor changes in the specification 
strongly affect the coefficient estimates in this model. Therefore, caution is required 
interpreting these results. 
 
Our final robustness test examines the potential influence of outliers through cross-validation. 
We rerun Table 2, regression 3 a hundred times, each time omitting the observations of a 
different country. The resulting coefficient estimates and p-values for the four different 



















































Figure based on the regression specification of Table 1, regression 3 (i.e., two-way fixed effects, and sample covering the full period). 
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There is no evidence that any individual country could change the general thrust of our 
argument. For World Bank investment projects and IMF stabilization programs, coefficients 
are always negative and insignificant (upper two panels of Figure 2). For the IFIs’ structural 
adjustment programs, the coefficient estimates are always positive and turn significant when 
their values exceed about 0.60. For the IFIs’ PRS-based lending, all coefficient estimates are 
positive and significant at least at the 10% level. Their values range from +0.80 to +1.15. 
 
All in all, these robustness tests reinforce our confidence in the results of Table 2. They 
confirm the positive relationship between PRS programs and democratization. They equally 
confirm the less clear, but nonetheless positive role of structural adjustment programs. And 
they mostly reproduce the negative, but insignificant results for IMF stabilization and World 
Bank project lending. Except for the insignificance of the IMF-STB and WB-INV, these 
results are in line with our hypotheses about the effect of different forms of conditionality on 
democratization. While process-related conditionality appears to be most successful, policy 
conditionality can also have a limited positive effect. This corresponds to our arguments 
regarding the impact of these types of conditionality on the fungibility of aid inflows.  
 
Conclusion 
World Bank and IMF lending programs come along with different types of conditionality. We 
believe that lending instruments with suitable conditionality may also pave the way to 
democratization. The mechanism we propose works through a reduction of the fungibility of 
aid inflows. To the extent that aid is fungible, it can be (re)allocated by autocratic regimes for 
their own purposes. Fungibility is reduced when conditionality relates to general institutional 





Our empirical analysis based on panel regressions for a sample of hundred developing 
countries over 32 years (1980-2011) and different types of IFI lending largely confirms these 
results: IFI lending positively affects democratization when it strengthens domestic 
accountability mechanisms and thereby reduces the fungibility of aid. This is true for PRS-
based lending and SAP, albeit to a lesser extent. Otherwise, effects are largely insignificant.  
 
From a policy perspective, these results are encouraging. While initial critiques may have 
been correct in pointing at the negative effect of IFI lending programs for democratization, 
both institutions seem to have adapted in appropriate ways to the criticism when developing 
their more recent instruments. While individual case studies about the PRS process usually 
highlight the shortcomings even within this new approach, our global, cross-country analysis 
indicates that at least some positive change has been achieved.  
 
An interesting follow-up question that we could not address here is related to organizational 
behavior: What made these international organizations adjust their processes in the 
appropriate way? But also: Why did they not adjust them completely so as to even more 
strongly enforce recipient government accountability towards its citizens? For instance, 
criteria to measure accountability and civil society participation in the process of developing 
the country’s poverty reduction strategy might deserve a more prominent place in the World 
Bank’s Country Performance Rating (CPR), which represents the major set of indicators used 
for the World Bank’s decisions on credit disbursements. These questions are beyond the 
scope of the present analysis, but could be taken up within the more general literature on the 
effectiveness of international organizations. 
 
In addition, it appears relevant to assess the interplay of the IFIs with other donors. This 




donor that is not included in the donor coordination and harmonization efforts launched in the 
context of the Paris Declaration in 2005. Since resources are fungible not only across 
government activities, but also across donors, it will be difficult to enforce reform 
requirements if China offers the same resources without any such strings attached. To be 
effective, requirements need to be based on consensus across donors, and no single donor will 
be able to avoid aid fungibility unless unless they are so important that their aid volumes 
cannot plausibly be matched by any alternative sources. 
 
Our results demonstrate the variation in how regimes deploy different types of resources. 
When these resources are provided through foreign aid, the donors have the choice to select 
aid types that are conducive to democratization. By conditioning the resource flow on 
accountability and relevant reforms they can counterbalance other, negative effects of the 
external resources. Hence the ‘aid curse’ might be more easily dealt with than the ‘resource 
curse’ more generally. This is true at least, if resources are managed within the country, 
without the interference of external actors. However, in practice, the extraction of mineral 
resources in developing countries often involves foreign technology, foreign investors, and 
frequently, foreign aid. If the latter applies, the link between pure resource flows and policy 
and/or process conditions conducive to a democratic development could be introduced just as 
for IFI lending discussed in this paper. This would, however, also require a change of 
perspective for the foreign companies involved. With their focus on joint efforts on the part of 
developing and developed countries alike, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed 
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